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A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relation-
ship between the performance of an aviation squadron and
the characteristics of its personnel. The emphasis is on
identifying the characteristics which have the greatest a.nti
most significant impact on the effectiveness of a U.S.
Marine Corps fighter squadron. If a model can be developed
that accounts for these variables, then forecasting
probable product ivity /readiness (in terms of the dependent
variable) can be accomplished, and better predictions can
be made regarding the impact of manpower policy decisions
on squadron performance.
In a commercial enterprise, profit and loss ar^ used to
measure the success and failure of the firm. It is also
used to determine the feasibility and advisability of
personnel decisions. The hiring of additional personnel
often must be Justified by an increase in market share or
as a result of expansion requirements. Precise formulas
have been developed that show how much additional revenue
must be generated to warrant the additional manpower costs
under consideration.
In the military there is no profit and loss index or
other measure that can be utilized to justify and procure
additional resources. There is not a simple common
measurement that can be used as a yardstick of the
productivity/readiness of a military unit. How then,
particularly in a time of relative peace, can the military
Justify its resources, particularly in the area of
manpower? As manpower costs continue to scar, so will
congressional requirements for tangible evidences and
concrete support of military requests and expenditures.
The military has long been able to identify how much
it costs to acquire an E6 with specific military training
and qualifications. What it has not been able to show is
the contribution that this individual makes to the unit's
readiness/productivity. Until models can be developed that
will explicitly dissect and demonstrate this contribution,
all of the military billet cost models will remain
incomplete and distorted.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to explore personnel
characteristics and what impact they have on unit
readiness/productivity. This study is a macro approach to
the problem. It is intended to explore the feasibility of
such models and serve as a general guide in the further
development of models that a.re used to explore billet cost
models.
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C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study focused on U.S. Marine Corps F—4 fighter
squadrons during the period 1 April 19S0 to 31 March 1985.
Since the emphasis of this thesis is on personnel
characteristics, variables such as squadron leadership,
location, facilities and weather were dismissed in order to
maintain that central focus. Because the readiness
measures utilized focused on the material condition of the
aircraft, the research data focused on the squadron
maintenance department, ignoring the maintenance augmen tees
and all other squadron personnel not directly associated
with the maintenance of the squadron aircraft.
This thesis was not severely limited or constrained by
available data, particularly on the squadron aircraft.
Data is readily available that gives a complete breakdown
of every work center, accounting for every minute of every
day for every person and every aircraft in the squadron.
Detailed records of the amount of maintenance time spent on
each and every system and subsystem are kept and analyzed.
Future studies will find these data invaluable in
developing future models. The personnel data were limited
by what was recorded in the Master Files at Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps. This limitation precluded expanding the
model by including several other independent variables.
These are discussed in Chapter VII.
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The starting date for the data mas selected based on
the incorporation of several new methods of data reporting
that became effective in 1979. A new reporting system was
developed and implemented allowing for more accurate and
precise records to be kept. Since the data did not become
relatively error—free until early 1930, the starting point
for this study was April, 1980.
The number of squadrons for this analysis was reduced
to the nine F-4 squadrons that maintained and utilized the
F—4J/S aircraft throughout the entire interval being
studied. It was assumed for this thesis that each of the
nine squadrons analyzed had the same responsibilities and
training considerations. It was also assumed that each
unit was staffed at a fair share of the available manpower
pool
.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A regression model was developed that supported the
importance of several personnel characteristics to the
effectiveness of a Marine aviation unit. The number of
personnel, divided into Ei to E5 and E6 to E9 proved to be
statistically significant and have a positive impact on
mission capable rates (MC), Non—main tenance schools had a
positive impact on MC while maintenance schools had a
negative impact on it.
The computed elasticities of the means were revealing
as well. A ten percent increase in Ei to E5 personnel
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yielded a 3.2 percent increase in MC compared to a 1.7
percent increase for the same ten percent increase in E6 to
E9 personnel. Since the average number of personnel that
^rs E5 or below is more than four times greater than the
average number of E6 to E9 personnel, the effect of one
additional E6 to E9 on MC is more than twice the effect of
one additional El to E5.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to properly understand the logic and reasoning
of the analysis and the conclusions drawn from the model,
an elementary understanding of U.S. Marine fighter aviation
is required. While very general in nature, this
information is vital to the proper understanding of the
regression model that was developed.
A Marine F—4 squadron is comprised of approximately two
hundred thirty—five enlisted Marines, thirty— five officers
and twelve fighter aircraft. There are currently twelve
active duty fighter squadrons in the U.S. Marine Corps.
Three of these squadrons are now equipped with the new
F/A— IS Hornet aircraft. The other nine squadrons are
scheduled to replace their aging F—4 Phantoms with the
F/A- IS Hornet by the end of this decade.
Squadron personnel are assigned by Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, based on a "fair share" of available
manpower. They are not manned at full Table of
Organization (T/0) strength, but rather average 85—93/1 of
the T/0 in total numbers. Since the average tour length is
three years, each squadron finds itself in a constant state
of turnover in both enlisted and officer personnel.
Appendix A depicts the Maintenance Department section of
the U.S. Marine Corps fighter squadron, according to the
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Table of Organization. The augmentees listed are those
individuals that are assigned to the squadron but work at
the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) where actual
component repair is done. These individuals are
responsible for the repair of components for all the
fighter squadrons aboard the base/ship. Therefore, they
were removed from the data base for this analysis.
During peacetime, a squadron focuses on two primary ob-
jectives; training the aircrew to be fully combat ready,
and training the maintenance personnel to achieve and keep
the aircraft full mission capable (FMC). These objectives
encompass the reasons for the constant exercises,
deployments, and inspections that a squadron is either
preparing for, undergoing, or recovering from. Training is
a daily, on—going process in aviation, one that is taken
very seriously both in the air and on the ground.
Aircrew (comprised of a pilot and a radar intercept of-
ficer (RIO)) are trained in accordance with a very exacting
and rigorous syllabus. The manual for this is called the
Training and Readiness Manual (T &. R). This manual sets up
guidelines for each sortie an aircrew must complete. Each
completed sortie is worth a percentage value which is
credited to the individual's combat rating percentage
(CRP). Since each of these training and proficiency
flights expires after a specified period of time ( normally
three to twelve months) it sometimes becomes difficult in a
15
particular month not to lose CRP. This system does provide
a good means of evaluating aircrew as well as planning
exercises that will test potential areas of weakness.
Maintenance personnel a.re also in a constant state of
training, although not as rigidly defined. Eeyond the
initial schooling that each perspective mechanic and
technician receives after boot camp, there is a steady
stream of "on— the—Job" training as well as an occasional
intermediate level school. Much of the training in the
squadron deals with diagnoses and troubleshooting.
Additionally, as an individual becomes more senior, he
begins to take on more responsibility. He may find himself
35 a crew leader, work center supervisor, flight line
troubleshcoter , or Quality Assurance Representative.
As shown in Appendix B, each division is comprised of
from one to five individual work centers. A typical
division is illustrated in Appendix C. Each work center
has a work center supervisor (normally an E6 or above) who
is responsible for his work center. The work center, or
shop as it is normally called, is task organized around the
tempo of operations. Normally the work center is divided
into three, eight hour crews. Day crew ( 0S00- 1630 hours)
has the normal responsibility of launching and recovering
aircraft, as well as making quick repairs in support of the
daily flight schedule. Night crew ( 16233—24-00 hours) does
the majority of the maintenance and extensive
troubleshooting on the aircraft. Mid crew < 2400-13303
hours) completes any unfinished maintenance and prepares
the aircraft for morning launches.
The hub of the maintenance department is maintenance
control. Aircraft air<3 assigned for flight by maintenance
control, and upon return, the aircraft are assigned to work
centers by maintenance control. A very precise and
well—defined paperwork flow is outlined in the four volume
OPNAVINST 4790.2. Each aircraft is accounted for every
hour of the day and is either mission capable (MO or not
mission capable (NMC), as defined in Appendix D. All
maintenance performed is documented very carefully and
thoroughly. A very simplified version of the
decision—mak ing process of a maintenance controller is
provided in Appendix E.
It is the Maintenance Data System ( MDS ) that keeps a
record of each aircraft and its status. As maintenance is
being performed on an aircraft, its status may change
several times. A brief example of this is provided in
Appendix F. At the end of each month, statistics are
compiled on the squadron as a whale showing the squadron
Mission Capable Rate, Full Mission Capable, as well as
flight hours, aborts, and a host of other statistical
reports. Aircraft data is analyzed in depth and reports
are available and distributed throughout the command
structure.
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Many squadron comparisons are based on mission capable
(MC) or full mission capable (FMC) rates. These a.re often
used by the Aircraft Group Commander, as well as higher
authority, to measure his squadrons' performance and
capabilities. Therefore, there Ars high incentives to do
everything possible to keep the aircraft performance rates
as high as possible. The quest for the highest rates
possible often has the greatest impact on the
decision—mak ing processes of the maintenance department.
18
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Any attempt to examine the effect of various inputs on
the level of output requires a working knowledge of
production functions. Considerable time and effort were
expended by Brown and Schwartz in their studies of aviation
resources and readiness. Their work included the following
four properties of a production function:
(1) An increase in the level of any input should
produce an increase in the level of output.
(2) Subsequent increases in the level of any one
input, holding all other inputs constant, should
produce smaller and smaller absolute increases in the
level of output.
(3) The marginal increase in output resulting from an
increase in any one input will be greater if other
inputs are also measured.
(4) Many different combinations of inputs can be used
to produce the same level of output. CRef.l: p. 7 3
In 1977 Horowitz and Sherman [ Ret. 2j conducted a study
on crew characteristics and conditions of various
subsystems aboard ship. The study determined that the
average paygrade of the crew and the complexity of the
equipment were consistently impacting on the condition of
the equipment.
Marcus CRef. 3 1 took the production function and uti-
lized it in his work to determine a least—cost mix of
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personnel, maintaining constant output measures. The
analysis was based on Navy A—7 aircraft squadrons using a
production function to obtain the demand requirements.
Because this approach also gave estimates of substitution
elasticities, potential tradeoffs in input variables were
readily identifiable.
The model had two versions to it, the first using the
number of flights and the second using quarterly mission
capable (MO rate as the output measure or dependent
variable. The input or independent variables of his
primary model included number of aircraft, number of
personnel in grades El—E3, number of personnel in grades
E4—E6, and number of personnel in grades E7—E9. There were
several other models examined using breakdowns of skill
levels, experience levels, educational groups, and mental
groups individually as independent variables.
In general, the study concludes that a least cost force
would call for a reduction of eighteen personnel in the
grades El—E3, a reduction of thirteen personnel in the
grades of E4—E6, and an increase of seven in the grades of
E7—E9. These conclusions were based on using the parameter
values obtained from regressing flights on pay grades and
then obtaining elasticities.
In several areas this project admitted to finding un-
predictable and conflicting results that were unexpl ainabl
e
and dismissed by the author. As the first part G'I •. I I X 3
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thesis, the Marine Corps data was used in the model
suggested by Mr. Marcus. The results were completely




= .1257). The only variable found to be
statistically significant was the number of aircraft.
This model did, however, provide a good starting point
for the development of the model proposed by this thesis.
It must be emphasized however, that since mission capable
and flights make up only a portion of the
readiness/productivity of a squadron, they should not be
utilized for the purpose of determining least cost, or
personnel tradeoffs. Research in this area must include
much more detailed data on the impact of an individual on
the unit.
Mission capable rates and number of flights da indicate
a portion of a unit's productivity or effectiveness but so
do many other variables such as training accomplished,
number of reported discrepancies, number of aborts, and
inflight failures. What percentage of
readiness/productivity is captured by each of these
variables is unknown. Therefore, until a dependent
variable is found that can be proved to fully capture unit
product ivi ty /readiness, models acs incapable of providing





The data base that was used for the personnel com-
putations was obtained from the master files at
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Data was requested on all
personnel assigned to Marine fighter squadrons as of the
33th of March, June, September and December starting with
June 33, 1983 and terminating with 33 March 1985. Data was
provided on each of the twelve tactical F—4 squadrons as
well as the one training squadron. The data fields s.r&
listed in Appendix G.
Billet MOS (EMOS) proved to be of far less value than
primary MOS. Initially, it was thought that Billet MOS may
identify individuals that may be working in work centers
other than those identified by their Primary MOS (PMOS).
Upon examination of the data however, it was found that
seldom was there a difference, and often BMOS was left
blank. Therefore, PMOS was used exclusively in determining
an individual's work center.
Time in grade and time in service were selected as
further discriminators for experience and expertise and a
method of further sorting grades. Because of the problems
encountered in the model and the lack of statistical
significance computed when incorporated into the model,
they mere not used.
Time in unit was requested as an indicator of group
cohesion and uniformity. It was believed that a unit with
a higher average time in unit may achieve higher levels of
readiness because of their familiarity with one another and
consistent, established routines. Although not listed in a
separate field on the Master Files at Headquarters Marine
Corps, it was initially believed that this information
could be obtained by analyzing Monitor Command Code (MCC)
and Reporting Unit Code (RUC) assignments. The resultant
field had many entries in excess of 120 months (ten years)
and a mean in excess of 48 months (four years). Since a
normal squadron tour is thirty—six months, this information
had to be disregarded as unreliable.
Time to End of Authorized Service ( EAS ) was selected as
a measure of the "short-timer" and his assumed lower
productivity as he nears his end of service. It was also
chosen to reflect increased lost work days for release
physicals, dental exams, and numerous other administrative
tasks that decrease a worker's availability when he decides
to leave the service.
The education codes (education level, education major
and years of education) were chosen to measure any impact
education may have on levels of readiness. They were later
discarded because of the amount of time that often
^.o
transpired between educational experience and records being
updated to reflect this acquired education.
Service entrance scores (Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery) tuere selected to give a base or entry
level of individuals. This immediately presented several
problems. In the 1970 T s the ASVAE exams replaced the Armed
Forces Qualification Tests. Because the personnel involved
ranged from six months to twenty—three years of service
ASVAE scores were not available on all personnel. Many had
enlisted using the AFQT as the entrance exams. Some had
enlisted during the ASVAE misnorming problems that occurred
in the mid— i970 7 s and these scores had never been corrected
from the Marine Corps Master Files. All of these scores
therefore were eliminated from the models.
School codes were entered to show the many military
schools each individual had attended during his career.
All the codes were compiled and divided into two
categories: maintenance and formal schooling. Maintenance
schools were defined as those that would enhance an
individual's ability to perform maintenance on an F—
4
aircraft. This division was based on the course
description. The schools s.rs listed in Appendix H. Ail
other schools listed were labeled as formal schools and
included NCO Leadership School, Embarkation School, Staff
NCO Academy and Motor Vehicle Operator School.
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B. AIRCRAFT
The aircraft data file was received from Navy Mainte-
nance Support Office Department, the depository of all Navy
and Marine Corps aircraft statistical data. Data was
collected for all Marine F-4 squadrons from April 1980
through March 1985. Since this data was given in monthly
totals, it was totaled and averaged over the relevant
quarter to allow it to be merged with the personnel file.
During this period, the F—4 aircraft appeared in Marine
squadrons in three models: F-4J, F—4N, and F-4S. The F-4N
was dropped from the data base because of its dissimilarity
between it and the other two models and also because of it =
complete phase out by 1983. This reduced the number of
squadrons analyzed to ten. The F-4J and F-4S had enough
similarity that they were treated as the same aircraft for
this study. VMFAT— 101, the training squadron, was dropped
from the analysis because of the differences in its size
and mission. Therefore, the final aircraft data base
represented nine squadrons.
There is a wealth of summary data available in this
report. A listing of each of the major status codes is
computed and recorded in this report along with further
subdivisions of these codes. Much of the data available
was considered for inclusion as an independent or dependent
variable. Most of these measures had to be discarded
because of their measurement of a very restrictive portion
of squadron readiness/productivity. Other data was
disregarded because of the concern over potential
manipulation of the data and the misleading analysis that
could result.
The number of aircraft during the month was computed by
taking the number of hours aircraft a.re reported as
equipment in service (EIS) for the month, divided by the
number of hours in the month. This was then averaged for
the quarter. The measurements of mission capable (MO and
not mission capable supply (NMCS) a.rs discussed in Chapter
V.
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V. MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY/ READ I MESS
Readiness is an illusive quality which is often mea-
sured differently because of the vast differences in
experience levels and backgrounds of those trying to
measure it. To compound the problem me must introduce the
possibility of "gaming" the measurement. Gaming is the
ability to manipulate the measurement so it will produce a
more complimentary figure. Many of the readiness
measurements are fairly simple to game.
Flight hours are probably the most frequently used mea-
surement for comparison among like squadrons. It is also
probably the easiest to game. In a fighter squadron,
simply put three external fuel tanks on each plane and have
them fly at maximum endurance airspeed and each sortie will
generate about 2.5 hours of flight time. The average
flight time of a fighter is 1.2 hours. Therefore one
squadron can fly half as often during the month yet
generate far more hours. Additionally, since the fighter
aircraft is not best utilized for most of its missions at
maximum endurance airspeed, the aircrew are developing bad
habits which could prove fatal in a time of open
host i lit ies.
Sorties or flights is another measurement often uti-
lized. To game this measurement we simply do the reverse
of gaming flight hours. We remove all external fuel tanks
and we fly at high airspeed. This decreases the flight
time dramatically to where the average flight becomes 0.9
hour. This allows the squadron to fly each aircraft more
frequently each day. Additionally, if its facility has
refueling pits (allowing the aircraft to refuel without
shutting down the engines) the squadron will be able to fly
each aircraft up to 6 time a day with a minimum amount of
maintenance between flights.
Full Mission Capable CFMC) is defined as hours in which
an aircraft has all of its associated systems fully
operational and capable of performing all assigned
missions. Mission Capable (MC) time is defined as hours in
which an aircraft is capable of performing at least one of
its assigned missions. Both of these measurements ars
calculated as percentages of the total hours available in a
month and aggregated for the entire squadron of aircraft.
In theory, this should give a good indication of the
mechanical shape of the aircraft.
In practice this is one of the easiest statistics to
game. All the figures Are computed from squadron documents
and B.r<s extremely difficult to check for authenticity.
There s.re a variety of schemes available to allow a
squadron to select what they want their FMC and, to a
lesser degree, MC figures to be. Since the data have an
invisible trail and limited audit capability, these
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measurements are becoming increasingly meaningless. They
are, however, still widely used at upper levels for
comparison purposes.
Repeat discrepancies are problems that reoccur on the
next flight subsequent to maintenance repair. They serve
as an indicator of true knowledge of the aircraft systems
and thoroughness of the maintenance effort. Unfortunately,
these figures too, are tied to squadron generated
maintenance documentation thereby allowing the squadron to
control the number of repeat discrepancies that actually
appear statistically.
A—799 is a code that is used by the Intermediate Main-
tenance Department (AIMD). The mission of the AIMD is to
repair the components that the squadron has removed and
replaced with operational components. If a squadron turns
in a component that is later found to be operational and
without defect it is labeled as A—799 or no defect found.
This would seem to indicate that the squadron is guessing
at what is wrong with the aircraft or using improper
troubleshooting procedures. Since this document is
generated outside the squadron, it would seem to give a
fairly accurate picture of this area of maintenance,
Gaming this is a little more difficult but not impos-
sible. If a squadron member can cultivate the friendship
of an AIMD technician he can often coerce the technician
into bench checking the component during his lunch hour or
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after hours. Since the component has not actually been
turned over to the AIMD, no paperwork is generated and so
there is no A—799 count.
Safety records in general, and accident-free hours in
specific, would seem to evaluate a very important part of
squadron readiness. They too, however, a^rs fairly easy to
manipulate. On all but the most serious accidents and
mishaps, investigations a.re done using personnel from
within the squadron. It therefore becomes very difficult
to be completely objective and detached in making an
evaluation. Accidents therefore become mishaps which
become incidents which become non reportable and the result
is a squadron with thousands of accident free flight hours.
Exercises such as missile shoots used to be considered
an exceptional measurement of aircrew skills as well as
maintenance performance. It was very easy to grade. The
missile either fired or it didn't. The missile either hit
the target or it didn't. What could be easier to score.
Then the squadrons got wise. If they launched three
aircraft instead of two they had a better chance of
launching one missile than if they only launched two
aircraft. Then they found the critical point in firing the
missile. They discovered that if they in fact fired the
missile before they told the ground controller to turn the
drone, they had an almost 120/1 chance of destroying the
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drone and nobody could prove they had launched the missile
cut of sequence.
Aircrew had a very rigid syllabus that they must com-
plete. Each completed mission in the syllabus has a
certain weight factor or percentage tied to it. The goal
is to reach 100/i which is full combat qualified. Completed
missions expire after a certain number of months depending
on the difficulty. Therefore, aircrew must fly a certain
amount of syllabus hops Just to maintain their currency in
certain mission specific areas. Each month a squadron
reports the increase/decrease on each of its aircrew.
Since these documents airs generated by the squadron,
they too, are subject to gaming. Since there ars no
evaluators on most flights, it is up to the individual to
determine if he successfully completed the assigned
syllabus flight. If there is a push to show a big increase
it is not uncommon for a person to take credit for two or
three syllabus missions on a single flight. Flights that
require an evaluation are done from personnel within the
squadron so successful completion is assumed and expected.
Every month each squadron would publish a squadron op-
erations/maintenance plan. In it would be a calendar of
the next month with the number of projected flights for
each day. This became a good method of evaluating the
forecasting capability of the squadron as well as the
ability of the squadron to meet a demand, even if it was
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self-imposed. Many Group Commanders became increasingly
aware of the percentage of the number of sorties flown to
the number of sorties forecasted.
As this percentage became more popular for evaluation,
squadrons found a method to game it. Since the percentage
was based on total sorties flown to total sorties scheduled
it was found that both these numbers could be easily
manipulated. First, the squadrons would underestimate the
sorties scheduled on a daily basis. Then, they would
write— in or add—on sorties as the day progressed. This
meant that they could schedule ten sorties and fly fifteen
because of add-ons and they would immediately be five
sorties ahead of goal for the month. This led to squadrons
achieving 1513—20(3 percent of their goals for the month.
The squadron's abort rate was also often used for com-
parison purposes. An aircraft was considered an abort if
it was assigned to fly a mission and they subsequently
broke, either before flying or before completing its
assigned mission. When this happened, a code was entered
on the maintenance documentation form which labeled the
type of abort that occurred. The key here is that the
discrepancy is discovered by the aircrew.
It immediately becomes obvious how to game this figure.
If a discrepancy is discovered on the ground before or
after flight by the aircrew, it is an abort. However, if
it is discovered by maintenance personnel, it is ceded and
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displayed as part of the inspection checks. Therefore if
maintenance personnel walk around the aircrew on the
preflight and postflight inspections and a discrepancy is
discovered, if the maintenance personnel writes up the
discrepancy it is not listed as an abort. This technique
has actually been found to reduce aborts to about fifty
percent of what they previously were recorded at.
There are many other readiness measures. Unitrep, air-
craft utilization, critical NEC/MOS, personnel staffing,
disciplinary actions, and manhours expended a.r^ Just a few
of them. Ail of these plus those mentioned in greater
detail above possess the same basic problem. They all
measure a part of aviation readiness but none give alone
gives a good reading of overall squadron readiness. So the
problem really becomes how to combine some of these
measures in such a manner to capture in a model a true and




All of the models discussed in this thesis use Mission
Capable (MC) as the dependent variable since it was the
best single indicator of readiness/productivity as well as
being least susceptible to manipulative measurements.
The first model explored was one of the models sug-
gested by the Marcus study reviewed in Chapter III, using
the U.S. Marine Corps data obtained for this study. The
data used for this model incorporated data for the entire
squadron, not just the maintenance department.
The results using the Marcus model on this data a.re
shown in Table 1. El—E3 represents the total number of
personnel in pay grades El to E3 in the squadron. E4-E6
represents the total number of personnel in pay grade E4 to
E6 in the squadron. E7—E9 represents the total number of
personnel in pay grade E7 to E9 in the squadron. The
number of aircraft is computed by dividing the total number
of equipment in service (EIS) hours by the total EIS hours
available per month per aircraft.
Interaction terms are introduced into a model if it is
believed that the difference in the dependent variable for
two levels of one independent variable depend on the level
of another independent variable. In this model, variable 5




Parameter t for HO
Variabie Estimate Para =
Intercept 34.52 2.67
( 1 ) E1-E3 -0.64 -1. 13
(2) E4—E6 -0.20 -0.34
(3) E7-E9 0.4S 0. 12
(4) Number of A/C 14.61 2.04
(5) ( 1 ) X •' 2 ) 0. 11 0. 13
<6> ( 1 ) X (3) ~Z DO liUI
(7) (2) x (3) 1.40 0.60
(S) ( 1 ) X (4) -1. 13 -0 . 38
(9) ( 2 ) x (4) -0.20 -0.06
( 10) ( 3 ) x (4) —16. 62 -1.88












R==. 1257 Adjusted R==.0754
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Variable 6 represents the interactions between E1-E3 and
E7—£7. Variable 7 represents the interactions between
E4—E6 and E7—E9. Variable 8 represents the interactions
between El—E3 and number of aircraft. Variable 9
represents the interactions between E4-E6 and number of
aircraft. Variable 10 represents the interactions between
E7-E9 and number of aircraft.
A t—distribution can be used to test the significance
of each of the independent variables. The standard null
hypothesis is that each independent variable has no effect
on predicting the dependent variable. If, however, the
computed t—statistic is greater than the absolute value of
two (which infers that it is more than two standard
deviations from zero) the estimated coefficient is
significant at the 0.05 level. This is the level most
often used to show the predictive value of an independent
variable on a dependent variable.
It becomes immediately evident from the results in
Table 1 that there is not a good fit between this data and
the Marcus model. The results of the t—test, for the null
hypothesis that each individual parameter is equal to zero,
indicate that each of the independent variables is within
two standard deviations of zero. This accounts for only
one parameter (number of air craft ,. 0433 ) being
statistically significant. The adjusted R=
, .0754, (which
measures the amount of the variation in the dependent
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variable that is accounted for by the independent
variables) was very low which helped confirm the weakness
in the model when applied to these data-
It appeared that the Marcus model was run including all
personnel in the squadron. As discussed in Chapter 2, this
may be inappropriate for the dependent variable MC. While
augmentees are assigned to the unit itself, their
contribution to the squadron's mission capable rate is
primarily reflected through the two supply categories ( PMCS
and NMCS) of the system. Since they do not work solely for
their squadron, they must be removed from the model.
This was done with the data and the model was rerun
with little difference in the outcome. The adjusted R=
increased to . 1070, but again the only independent variable
that was statistically significant was aircraft. The
Marcus model did, however, provide a good starting point
for this thesis. All of the following models ar& based on
the personnel with the maintenance department, exclusive of
augmentees and other non—maintenance personnel.
Since pay grade seemed to have little effect in the
Marcus model, personnel were sorted into five divisions
based on their PMOS and commonality. Division 1 consisted
of flight line and ground support personnel. Division 2
consisted of maintenance administration and maintenance
control personnel. Division 3 consisted of all airframes
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division personnel. Division 4 consisted of all avionics
personnel. Division 5 consisted of all ordnance personnel.
A variable labeled E1-E5 percentage was included to ac-
count for the worker/supervisor ratio. This was computed
as the number of El—E5 divided by the number of personnel
in the maintenance department.
Turmoil that occurs when an individual leaves the ser-
vice may be significant. To measure this, EAS percentage
was computed by taking the number of El—E5 personnel with
less than six months to EAS and dividing that by the number
of E1-E5 personnel in the squadron.
Formal education was broken down into maintenance
schools and non—maintenance schools. Maintenance schools
were those schools having a direct bearing on the
maintenance of the aircraft and are listed in Appendix H.
All other schools listed were categorized non—main tenance
schools. Each of these totals was divided by the number of
personnel in the maintenance department, which provided an
average per person figure for these two categories.
The model shown in Table 2 is the result of a regres-
sion using the variables described above. The model
demonstrated a relatively high adjusted R= (.5910), but had
only one significant independent variable. The t— tests
show that the independent variables chosen are not closely
related to the dependent variable in the model. This model
also raises questions about division 5 (ordnance) personnel
3B
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF I/O MODEL
Parameter t for HO:
Variable Estimate Para = Prob> ! t i
Intercept 67.03 3.22 ,0016
Division i Pet. 21.35 4.38 .0001
Division 2 Pet. 3.53 0.90 .3673
Division 3 Pet. 6.14 0.95 .3423
Division 4 Pet. 10.41
Division 5 Pet. —10.75 —1.76 .3805
E1-E5 Pet. -16.23 -0.62 .5379
EAS Pet. 4.64
Maint. Sen. -1.42 -0.65 .518;
Non-Main t Sen. 5.94 0.74 .4531











and their apparent inverse relationship with mission
capable. There is no reason to believe that a decrease in
ordnance personnel will lead to an increase in MC rate.
The model did indicate that breaking down the personnel
into five divisions was inappropriate.
A further analysis of the work flow of the maintenance
department indicated that much of the work that leads to
aircraft becoming mission capable is not the result of any
one work center or division but rather is the result of
cooperative efforts of all the divisions. Quite often
there were several divisions working together to repair one
problem.
Another concern was focused on the EAS variable. This
measure was initially constructed as a measurement of first
term personnel. In including E5 T s in this computation, the
variable was picking up some personnel in their second
enlistments. To ensure a measurement of only
first— termers, this variable was subsequently redefined tc
include only El to E4 personnel. The time to EAS was
redefined from six months to four months. This was based
on the observation that most of the lost work time due to
administrative ana medical matters occurs during the final
four months.
A Cobb—Douglas production function was proposed as an
alternative to the linear additive model used above. This
model allows an examination of a non— linear model, one in
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which the independent variables have a multiplicative
impact on MC rather than an additive impact. In this model
the marginal product of each input will always be positive,
but diminishing. However, returns to scale may be
increasing, constant, or decreasing. The model permits
interactions among the independent variables. The marginal
product of each input depends not only on the utilization
of that input, but also on the levels of the other inputs.
For example, this model captures the increased flexibility
a squadron enjoys as it acquires additional aircraft
(illustrated in Appendix E).
A Cobb—Douglas production function can be estimated us-
ing linear regression by applying a log transformation to
all of the variables. The result is an equation that
expresses the log of MC as a linear function of the logs of
the independent variables.
The log— linear model is displayed in Table 3. The re-
sults indicate a much stronger relationship between these
independent variables and the dependent variable, log MC.
More of the parameter tests ar& statistically significant
than on any of the previous models. This indicates a mere
appropriate functional form and better predictive value for
the independent variables. The level of significance









Para = Prob> !
t
Intercept 2.51
Log E1-E5 0. 33
Leg E6-E9 0. 13
Log E1-E4 EAS 0.03
Log Maint. Sch. -0.30
Log Non-Maint. Sch. 0. 15
Log NMCS -0. 13














R==.5722 Adjusted R==. S 1^"
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One troubling result of this model is the negative ef-
fect of aircraft. This may be somewhat explained by the
nearly absolute maximum limit of twelve aircraft per
squadron. The constraint on this variable may distort its
relationship with MC.
A simple linear version of the above model was esti-
mated, with the results shown in Table 4. Several things
stand out immediately. First is the fact that of the seven
independent variables, only two fall inside the two
standard deviation criterion. Both of these are much
closer to statistical significance than achieved on
previous models. This would indicate a model that has
independent variables with a closer relationship to the
dependent variable. The adjusted R3 climbed to .5306. The
results indicated that this is a good beginning model for
this type of analysis.
B. ANALYSIS
Because mission capable (MC) appears to be least sus-
ceptible to interpretive measurements, as discussed in
Chapter V,it was selected as the dependent variable. It is
one of the measures of a squadron's productivity/readiness
that is closely monitored throughout Marine Corps aviation.
Although masking many individual squadron strengths and
weaknesses, it does reflect the material condition of the
squadron's aircraft. For this study the mean or average
MO
TABLE 4
THE LINEAR AIRCRAFT MODEL
Par afTieter t for HO:
Variable Estimate Para = Prob>!T! at the Mean
Intercept 41.33 4. 15 .0001
E1-E5 3. 18 3.85 . 0002
E6-E9 0.39 •" *>g .0260
E1-E4 EA3 22.43 2.43 . 0140
Maint. Sen. -5.21 2.47 .0142
Non-Ma int. S c h 14. 35 1.70 .0920
NMCS -1.63 -10.33 .0001










value of MC mas found to be 72.2 percent with a standard
deviation of 11.36.
Quantity of personnel contributes significantly to MC.
However, the contribution of an E3 is not the same as the
contribution of an E7. Each is a contributor but in very
different, unique roles. For this reason personnel were
divided into workers and supervisors. This is not to infer
that E6 T s and above do not perform any aircraft maintenance
but rather to acknowledge their responsibilities as
supervisors and managers. A worker's value lies in his
ability to repair aircraft efficiently and effectively.
The supervisor's value is more in the coordination of his
personnel and any extensive troubleshooting that may be
required. Both impact MC but each has a separate and
distinct role to play. Their value then should be computed
separately. The mean value of El—E5 personnel in the
maintenance department was 129.92 with a standard deviation
of 12.S9G. The mean or average value of E6—E9 personnel in
the maintenance department was 31.24 with a standard
deviation of 4.13.
It must be emphasized that this model focused on the
maintenance department. Therefore, personnel assigned to
the squadron but not the maintenance department were
removed from the data. These personnel included those in
administration, operations, logistics and all augmentees.
Rerunning the model with all squadron personnel included in
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the data base proved to significantly weaken the model.





which measures the proportion of the total variation in the
dependent variable explained by the model, decreased more
than five percent for the model including all personnel.
This fact, combined with the belief that the contribution
of these non—maintenance personnel is in areas other than
MC, substantiates omitting them from a model which uses MC
as the dependent variable. Since this analysis focused on
MC, personnel not in the squadron maintenance department
were removed from the personnel data base.
An individual's productivity is influenced by many fac-
tors. As a worker approaches the time where he may be
making a vocational change, his measured productivity has a
tendency to decrease because of the additional constraints
on his time. In the case of the military, this decreased
productivity is heightened by such things as
administrative, medical and dental requirements prior to
release. Additionally, in many cases, individuals s^rs
shuffled to other units due to the individual's
non—deployable status. Since squadrons ^r^ constantly
building for the future, decisions regarding
responsibilities, training, and rewards are often made
ignoring those " short— t imers" who a.re or may be terminating
soGn .
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The independent variable EAS captures this situation.
It measures the percentage of all E—4 and below (first
termers) that have an end of active service (EAS) of four
months or less. This variable is a rough representation of
squadron turmoil due to attrition. The mean value was
9.76 percent with a standard deviation of 6.43 percent.
Formal education was divided into maintenance and non-
maintenance schools. All military schools contribute to
MC for a variety of reasons beyond a direct benefit of
increased maintenance skills. Leadership skills,
organizational skills, qualifications in motor transport
all have an effect on MC. Since school quotas air^ often
difficult to obtain, there is often a tight screening
process within the squadron to determine who will attend.
This factor may allow these variables to indicate a measure
of quality of personnel as well as military education
background. The mean or average value of maintenance
schools was 2.38 per man with a standard deviation of 0.30,
while the mean or average value of non-maintenance schools
was 0.61 with a standard deviation of 0.09. It must be
noted since all maintenance personnel attend a school to
qualify for their PMOS, each person starts with a base of
at least 1 in maintenance schools prior to arriving at his
first squadron.
Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) was included to rep-
resent the percentage of time in which a squadron is
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incapable of returning an aircraft to a mission capable
status. If a replacement part is unavailable, the squadron
can either try to cannibalize the needed part from another
NMC aircraft (usually a poor choice) or wait for the part
to arrive. The mean or average value was 6.06 with a
standard deviation of 4.07. This means that these
squadron's were averaging 6.06 percent of their monthly
time with non—flyabie aircraft because of non—avai iabi 1 i ty
of parts.
Since MC is measured from the total EIS for the squad-
ron (see Appendix D), the number of aircraft becomes
significant. Flying an aircraft too many hours per month
results in an increase in the number of maintenance hours
per flight hour. The opposite of this is also true. Not
flying the aircraft results in a lack of reliability of the
aircraft as it becomes more susceptible to dried and
cracked seals. An aircraft that flies infrequently is also
statistically more prone to abort a mission- Too few
aircraft often results in overflying some of them which
nearly always results in an increase in down time and
aborts in later months. Too many aircraft results in a
backlog of maintenance. Although squadrons ar<3 nearly
always assigned twelve aircraft, this number is in a
constant state of flu:-: due to aircraft modifications,
depot— level maintenance, and any extensive repair work that
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requires specialists. The mean value for aircraft was
10.29 with a standard deviation of 1.73.
The coefficient of determination (R3 ) for the model
presented in Table 4 shows that nearly 60/1 of the total
variation in MC is explained by this model. Using a
statistical significance of 0.05, the model shows ail the
independent variables except non—maintenance school (P =
.0923) and aircraft (P = .0649) to be statistically
significant. This means that these two variables do not
have as great a predictive value as the other independent
variables. They Are, however, very close to the 0.05 level
chosen for this study.
The parameter estimates all tend to react as would be
expected except for the variables EAS and maintenance
schools. The model shows an expected increase in MC for
independent increases in either category of number of
personnel or an increase in aircraft or non-maintenance
schools. It also shows the negative impact on MC of an
increase in NMCS.
The EAS variable has several contradictory features
that may have resulted in the illogical conclusion that
more " short— t imers" leads to an increase in MC. The term
measures those that may be leaving active service shortly.
It does not, however, record how many of them actually
re—enlisted or extended. If the number of reenl istments of
first term personnel was significant in any given period.
this variable would be mixing those that re—en 1 isted
(proven performers with probable high motivation) with
those choosing to leave (poor performers as well as those
choosing a vocational change). These factors could
certainly tend to cause this variable to become inaccurate
and misleading.
The variable that measures maintenance schools likewise
has a plausible but hidden explanation. Since all
maintenance personnel have attended at least one of these
schools (which qualifies him or her for a PMOS) prior to
arriving at the squadron, they Are actually starting with a
base of one rather than zero (like non—military schools).
What this negative value may be describing is the result of
too much formal schooling. While it is acknowledged that
the purpose is to increase the productivity of the
individual, the cost is the loss of the individual during
the training. Thus we see non—maintenance schools having a
positive impact on MC and we would expect to see a positive
impact on maintenance schools as well. However, because of
the inflated mean for maintenance schools (2.38) the
resultant negative impact on MC may well be magnifying the
loss of productivity.
The elasticities of the means given in Table 4 provide
an interesting insight. A ten percent increase in the
number of El to E5 personnel would statistically provide a
3.2 percent increase in MC. A ten percent increase in the
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number of E6 to E9 personnel would statistically provide a
1.7 percent increase in MC. It would take nearly a twenty
percent increase in the number of E6 to E9 personnel to
have the same effect as a ten percent increase in El to E5
personnel. A ten percent increase in El to E5 personnel is
approximately thirteen whereas a twenty percent increase in
E6 to E9 personnel is six. Deriving what mix would be most
cost effective is beyond the focus of this thesis.
However, because MC is a component of unit readiness/ pro-
ductivity the derivation of personnel mix would be accurate
only to the point where MC is an accurate measurement of
unit readiness/productivity.
C. SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS
The model presented gives hope to the possibility of
regression models becoming more accurate in assisting
manpower policy decisions. This model acts as predicted
and in the two variables that produced results contrary to
those expected (EAS and maintenance schools), it is
believed that further purification of these variables would
result in not only predictable results but also an increase
in the R= value of the model.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study is a very elementary, big picture analysis.
It was designed to show that a mathematical relationship
could be developed to draw general conclusions about
personnel characteristics and measures of readiness or
productivity. Since the dependent variable used is a
generalization of a single aspect of a squadron, the
results cannot be used to make specific recommendations
concerning optimal size or composition of a squadron.
This model falls short of expectations due to a lack of
personnel data that may have proved to have been very
beneficial in expanding the model. It is believed that the
addition of several independent variables would strengthen
this model dramatically.
Each individual should be measured for the amount of
time, in months, he or she has spent in the squadron. An
average value could then be computed for the squadron.
This average would equate to a measure of unit
cohesi veness, known to increase productivity.
A quarterly reenlistment index could be developed which
would be an indicator of squadron morale. Job satisfaction
results in increased retention and increased productivity.
High morale has the same results. Both of these ar<^
measured, to some degree, by reenlistment figures.
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Just as the number of aircraft affected MC, the number
of aircrew assigned and average flying time in months would
prove to be an asset to this model. The more aircrew that
are available results in more flying because of increased
competition for the aircraft. It would be predicted that a
higher average total flying time (experience) of the
aircrew would result in better discrepancy write-ups by the
aircrew as well as better inflight diagnosis of any
aircraft peculiarities. These accurate debriefs would
result in fewer repeated discrepancies, as well as less
required troubleshooting time, increasing MC.
Dummy variables could be inserted for special periods
of extremely high operational commitments. Additionally,
controls for holidays, periods of non— flying, and adverse
weather could likewise be inserted into the model.
An entire model could be built around the codes for
awaiting maintenance, particularly if the model was
designed to examine a specific work center or division. At
that point, comparisons of quantity and quality of
personnel can be made because the dependent variable
(manhours, for example) would reflect only the independent
variables from within the unit. It is on this level of
analysis that impact of workers and supervisors becomes
better defined and the experience level of personnel can be
brought more to bear on the model. This type of model may
demonstrate the impact of an additional supervisor as well
as what the proper ratio should be.
As models become more refined and data becomes more ac-
curate, productivity and readiness models can be added to
what has already been developed in determining the cost of
an unfilled billet. At that point the cost of the unfilled
billet will cease to be merely the compilation of the
getting an individual to a specific billet with a specific
background. Only then can the military demonstrate the full
ramifications of personnel cutbacks or decreased
reenl istments.
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The Maintenance Department comprises the largest number
of personnel in a squadron. It is organized in accordance
with OPNAVINST 4790.2 and is presented in an abbreviated
form in Figure 1.
! Aviation Maintenance Officer (0—4) !
! Asst. Aviation Maintenance Officer CLDO) !
i Quality Assurance i Maintenance Admin.
! Maintenance Control i
! Airframes i Av ion l cs .me Ordnance i
+ Power Plants + Electric
+ Metal + Com/Nav





rigure 1: Department Organization
&Z
The Aviation Maintenance Officer < AMO > , is a Naval Avi-
ator* or Radar Intercept Officer tasked with the responsi-
bility of the Maintenance Department. In almost every
case, he has attended an extensive, demanding school which
has given him the additional MOS designation 6002, Aviation
Maintenance Officer. In addition to this school, he has
normally had assignments as a division officer while
serving in a squadron as a lieutenant or captain.
The Assistant Aviation Maintenance Officer < AAMO ) , is
normally a Limited Duty Officer (LDO) who has started out
his oare^r as an enlisted man and has subsequently been
commissioned. He is not an aviator and thus is able to
devote his entire time and energies to the maintenance
department and its challenges and problems.
Quality Assurance is staffed by personnel from each of
the divisions. Their assignment to this division is based
on their experience and maturity. In addition to running
many of the maintenance performance monitoring systems,
they 5r<B required to perform inspections on critical
components that have been repaired.
Maintenance Administration personnel a.rs school trained
and designated (6046). They have the responsibility of
maintaining the various logbooks and extensive records that
are required on each aircraft. Much of their work is
clerical in nature.
OJ
Maintenance Control is the hub of the maintenance de-
partment. All maintenance is coordinated by them and ail
paperwork originates with them. Run by an LDO similar in
qualifications to the AAMO, he too, is not an aviator and
can focus full time on the maintenance department. Also in
this devision is a very senior Master Sergeant ( E—8 ) who
has 18 to 20 years of maintenance experience behind him.
Additional personnel to staff this division come from the
various work centers within the maintenance department.
The Airframes Division is comprised of five work cen-
ters: power plants, metal shop, hydraulics, flight
equipment, and safety equipment. Headed by an aviator or
Radar Intercept Officer, this is the largest division
within the maintenance department. This is the only major
division that does not have a Limited Duty Officer assigned
to it by the Table of Organization (T/0).
The avionics division is comprised of three work cen-
ters: electrical communication/navigation and radar. This
division has an Avionics LDO in charge and a division chief
assigned by T/0. This division is the most technical in
nature and therefore carries a larger proportion of
sergeants and Staff NCOs than any other division.
The line division is comprised of the flight line and
ground support equipment. This division usually has a
senior lieutenant or junior captain as the division officer
and rates an E—7 as the division chief. Chiefly
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responsible for the launching and recovery of aircraft,
this division carries a high percentage of Junior enlisted
personnel
.
The ordnance division is comprised of ordnance person-
nel. By T/0 it has an LDO as the division officer and an
E—8 as the division chief.
APPENDIX C
MAINTENANCE DIVISION ORGANIZATION
Each division is arranged similarly despite differences in
composition and responsibilities. Figure 2 presents the normal
layout of a division and its chain of command. The division may
be organized differently depending on the operational
requirements.
1 Di vi si on Off i (zsr ii
!
I
1 D i v i s i ori Chief i
1




Night Creu I I i X a Creui
Figure 'Z : Typical Division Organization
'_! J. V j.Each division has an aircrew or an LDO assigned as the
iion officer and an E7 or ES as the division chief. Each of the
jork centers has a work center supervisor assigned to it
•do
(normally an E6 or E7 ) . He is responsible for the working of his
work center, assignment of details, assignment to work shift, and
anything else that pertains to his work center. Each of the
three crews (the maintenance cycle is normally worked on a
twenty-four hour day) is run by a crew leader who is normally an
E6 or E5 . The crew leader is responsible for the assignment of
his personnel to the specific Jobs and priorities that have been
assigned to it by maintenance control. He is often a worker as
well as a manager and does much of the required inspection of
maintenance performed. Additionally, he is responsible for
ensuring all the paperwork is properly recorded and annotated on




A squadron is responsible and accountable for the sta-
tus of each of its aircraft twen ty— four hours a day.
Therefore, in a thirty day month the Equipment In Service
(EIS) hours of each aircraft would be 723 (24 hours x 32
days). In a thirty—one day month the EIS mould be 744.
1. Mission Capable (MC). MC is that percentage of EIS
hours in which an aircraft is mechanically of
performing at least one of its assigned missions (for
example, if the radar was not operational, the
aircraft could still perform one of its bombing
missions). This status can be subdivided into:
1A. Full Mission Capable (FMC). FMC is that
percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is
mechanically capable of performing all of its
assigned missions (all systems fully
operational )
.
IB. Partial Mission Capable (PMC). PMC is that
percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is
mechanically capable of performing some, but not
all, of its assigned missions. This can be
further divided into:
od
1E1. Partial Mission Capable Maintenance
(PiiC(M)). PMC(M) is that percentage of EI3
hours in which an aircraft is PMC and
maintenance is either being performed or
could be performed.
1B2. Partial Mission Capable Supply
(PMC(S)). PMC(S) is that percentage of EIS
hours in which an aircraft is PMC and
replacement parts had been ordered but not
received.
2. Not Mission Capable (NMC). NMC is that percentage of
EIS hours in which an aircraft is incapable of
performing any of its assigned missions (for example,
an aircraft without one of its basic, required
instruments, e.g. attitude direction indicator). This
category can be subdivided into:
2A. Not Mission Capable Maintenance <NMC(M)).
NMC(M) is that percentage of EIS hours in which
an aircraft is NMC due to unscheduled
maintenance.
2B. Not Mission Capable Supply (NMC(S>>.
NMC(S) is that percentage of EIS hours in which
an aircraft is NMC due to parts on order.
This is a simplification of the MDS status system and
omits several subcategories not germane to the material
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presented in this thesis. Based on the above definitions,
the following formulas would exist:
MC = FMC + PMC NMC = NMC(M) + NMC(S)
10(37. = MC +NMC PMC = PMC(M) + PMC(S)
723
APPENDIX E
MAINTENANCE CONTROL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
This example begins with an aircraft that was FMC when
it was launched, returns from flight.
I. Is it still FMC?
A. Yes - Prepare it for another flight (FMC).
B. No — Go to Question II.
II. Is the aircraft PMC?
A. Yes. A/C is now reportable PMC(M).
1. Is the A/C needed for daily commitments?
a. Yes - Prepare for flight PMC(M).
b. No — Troubleshoot the discrepancy.
1) Does it need parts?
a) no - Repair to FMC
b) Yes — order parts
(1) Are parts available?
(a) Yes Repair aircraft to FMC status.
(b) No A/C is now PMC(S)
i) Perform other maintenance 7
Yes, begin m<
— No, prepare f-
B. No. Go to question III.
III. This A/C is rsot flyable. It is now NMC. Does it
need parts?
A. No — repair to FMC status.
B. Yes — order parts.
1. Are parts available?
a. Yes — Repair to FMC status.
b. No - A/C is NMC(S)
.
1) Is there other maintenance to be performed?
a) Yes — Perform maintenance
b) No — Can the part be economically
removed from another A/C that is
estimated to remain down for an
extended period of time?
( i ) Yes — Remove part and return one
aircraft to FMC status.
( 2 ) No — A/C remains NMC ( S
)
This is a very simplified view of the decision—making
process that takes place every day in maintenance control,
Often aircraft return with an assortment of PMC and NMC
discrepancies that immediately complicate the above
procedure. Manpower constraints, scheduled maintenance
deadlines and operational commitments must be taken into
consideration. In all cases, an aircraft that had both PMC
and NMC would be carried as NMC. Skillful planning and
coordination can enable PMC discrepancies to be corrected
while an aircraft is NMCS allowing for an aircraft to go
from NMC to FMC status.
APPENDIX F
DISCREPANCY CYCLE
Perhaps the easiest may to understand how time is com-
puted and categorized is to follow a typical discrepancy
and maintenance cycle.
TIME EVENT ACTION REPORTED




(39S0 Work started Elapsed Main— Maintenance
tenance Time (NMCU)
(EMT)







1100 Ordered parts Awaiting parts Supply
(AWP) (NMCS)






1600 Beqan installation Elapsed main- Maintenance




TIME IVENT ACTION REPORTED





Hangar, Hangar Deck Spaces, Facilities,
Backlog, excessive workload.
Offshift Hours (Week-ends, holidays etc).
Other — weather, drill, parades, etc.
Awaiting AIMD — return of an engine
Flight Operations.










































Time to EAS 3
Time in Grade 3
Time in Service 3
Time in Unit 3





A2G Avionics Corrosion Control
A2S F—4J/F—4B/or RF—4E Electrical Systems
A2T Compact Wire Bundle
A4R AN-AWG ISA Basic
A5E F—4/RF—4 Armament System
BEW Weapons Support Radar Maintenance
BE2 Cryptographic Equipment TSEC/KG—22 Maintenance
B0H Explosive Ordnance Disposal Land Refresher
BSI Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Conventional Weapons
Disposal Indian Head
BSJ Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Basic
ESS Explosive Ordnance Disposal Refresher, Surface
E37 Conventional Ammo And Explosive Safety
CE0 Non—Destructive Inspection Specialist
C21 Non—Destruct ion Inspect i in
DS3M Data Processing Equipment Operator
EHT Fundamentals Of Digital Logic
E2D Microminiature Elec Circuit Repair
FDA Aircraft Maintenance Officer
FDF Aircraft Maintenance Officer Phase IV ( C—4D—201(3)
FFA Aviation Electronics Indoctrination
Code Description
M4E Work Center Supervisor
MSB Maintenance Control
M9A Quality Assurance
M9C Aviation Fundamentals (Ail 6;;::x MOS'S)
NAB Sealed Authentication Sys — Emerg Action Pros
RBW Weapons Systems
T04 Aircraft Engineer And Maintenance
T1K Factory Trng And Related Systems F—4/RF—
4
756 Weapons Employment Familiarization
763 Marine Aviation Supply Advanced
XRZ Maintenance Management Information Systems
X9.J Instructor Class C Course A Basic
X9K Aviation Fundamental Class P School
X9U Management Analysis Course, Naval Aviation
Officer School
X92 TSEC/K1-1A Crypto Maintenance
X94 TSEC KI-1A Unlimited
X 95 TSE C /KY-2S Un 1 i m i t e
d
3DF Maintenance Management
3DM Maintenance Management Officer
0DU KY-2S/KI-1A Limited Maintenance
QIE Administration Basic
017 RPS Custodian Procedures





11G Electrical Equipment Repair
liS Basic Electricity And Electronics — Aviation
Electricians Mate
iiT Basic Electricity And Electronics - Aviation Non
Navy
11U Basic Electricity And Electronics - Avionics
Repairman
131 Metalworker
132 Basic Metal Worker
136 Marine Cryogenics Equipment Technician
137 Marine Mechanical Fundamentals School Class D




24N Communication Security Material System - Basic
249 Technician Electronic Counter Counter—Measures
25J Electronic Countermeasures Operation
259 Electric 8c Electronic Measurements (Enlisted)
26X Crypto Maint., KY—28 Limited
27V Radio Fundamentals
27X Radar Fundamentals
27Z Integrated Fire Control Elec Repair
272 Electronics Basic
/ v
Code Descr i pt ion
2SA KY-S/2S/33 Maintenance
2SU SR MIL Crypto Supere < CY 200) (Formerly Senior
MIL Crypto Super)
30B Marine Aviation Supply Class C
30C Procurement Supply Trainiinq
329 Marine Aviation Supply Senior Enlisted Management
(Formerly AVN Supply ( En 1 ) )
3SD AN/AJB-7 Attitude Reference Bomb Computer And
AN/ASN-73A Vertical Flight Reference Set IMA
( C—602—3S2S
)
3SE MK-36-43 Destructor /ALL MODS (C-646-3107)
39D Digital Equipment Switching Technician
39S Digital Computer Fundamentals (YXC) ( C-000-3 1 78
3
409 Computer Programming Orientation
414 Fleet Analysis And Reporting (Redesig From
Analysis/Reporting
)
464 Precision Measuring Equipment
61B Maint Management And Info Systems
6i4 F—4B/J/N Aircraft Egress And Evironmen tal Control
System
623 Aviation Support Equipment Electrical Technician
YDH ( C-0Q0-3263
)




62R Aeronautical Technical Publications Library
Management OMA And IMA (C-500-3205)
623 Avionics Corrosion Control ( C-000—4176
)
624 Micro—Miniature Module Supervisors IMA
(C- 13S3-31 93)
63E AN/ALF-29A Countermeasures Chaff Dispenser Set
IMA (BQM)
63C AN/APX—64 (V) IFF Transponder Set IMA (BXA)
(C- 102-3065)
63K AN/ALQ-100 Coun termeasures Set IMA (ERB)
< C- 102-3074
)
63V Hydraulic Fundamentals (YXF) (C-000-31S0)
63W Indications And Warning Course
63X Aviation Fundamentals Aviation Structures
Mechanic Hydraulics
63Y Miniature Component Repair YXH (C—000—3182)
63Z F—4 Corrosion Control OMA (C -200—3196)
630 LEAR MA-1 Compass Systems IMA < BMB
)
631 AN/APN-154 (V) Radar Beacon IMA (BNB)
633 AN/APN-141 (V) Radar Altimeter IMA ( BNF
)
634 AN/ARN—52 (V) Tacan Receiver IMA (BCN/636
636 AN/APN-I71 ( V) Radar Altimeter (High Level) IMA
( BNK
)
635 AN/ASN-39/39A And AN/ASN-41 Navigational Compute)
Code Descr i pt ion
64B Aviation Machinists Mate J Jet Engine B
64H Aviation Structural Mechanic Metai smith
64K Aviation Structural Mechanic Structures B
64L Aviation Structural Mechanic H Hydraulic A
64M Aviation Structural Mechanic H Hydraulic E
64P Aviation Machinists Mate E
64R Aviation Structural Mechanic E Safety Equip A
64S Aviation Structural Mechanic E Safety Equip B
64X Aviation welding
640 Aviation Material Management
641 Aviation Familiarization
642 Aviation Mechanical Fundamentals A
643 Marine Aviation Engineering Clerical C
644 Aviation Maintenance Administration Man
645 Data Analysis Class C—
1
646 Aviation Support Equipment Technicians
647 Aviation Support Equipment Technicians Electrical
ASE A
648 Aviation Support Equipment Technicians Mechanical
ASM A




Aviation Ordnan ceman A
65
B
Av i a t i on Or dn an ceman B
Code Description
65E F-RF-4B/J Aircraft System Familiarization
Enlisted (FKB)
65R AN/ARC-51/51A AN/ARC-5 1 AX/5 IE RT 793/ASQ
RT-1010/ASQ-140 Communication sSys terns IMA (ECE)
66A Aviation Electronics Technician Navigation
66B Aviation Electronics Technician R Radar A
66
C
Aviation Fire Control Technician F Fire CNTL A
66D Avionics Intermediate
66H Aviation Radar Repair
66R Aicraft Maintenance Non—Destructive Inspection,
Class C
66S Data Systems Analyst, Class A
66U Aviation Radar Repair Course A
66Y Avionics Repairman
662 Aircraft Battery Mainteenance And Repair IMA
663 Avionics Technician, Class A
661 Avionics Fundamentals
662 Aviation Fire Control Tech Inter E AC: 1
663 Avionics Advanced, Class E
664 Aviaton Fire Control Technician
665 Advanced First Term Avionics Class A— 1, Nan—Navy
666 Aviation Electricians Mate A
667 Aviation Electricians Mate B
66G Aviation Electrician Mate Class B Intermediate AE





















Aviation Electricians Mats Advanced
Air Controls Electronics Operator
Aviation Fundamentals Aviation Ordnance
Aviation Ordnanceman Class C7
Aviation Fundamentals Aviation Structures
Mechanics Metalsmith
Aviation Fundamentals Avionics
Aviation Fundamentals Aviation Electrician
Aviation Fundamentals Aircrew Survival
Equi pmentman
Aviation Fundameentals Aviation Structures
Mechanics Safety Equipment





F—4B/J RF—4B Airframes Maintenance FLR
Aircrew Survival Equi pmentman , Class A
Parachute Rigger ! ntenance Class A
Parachute Packing Maintenance And Aerial Delivery
Aircrew Survival Equi pmentman , Class C7
AN/AJE—3A Loft Bomb Release Componen





37J F-4J CNI-ECM OMA ( FEV
)
87T AN/ARN-91 Tacan iMavigat ional System IMA
( AYM ) ( AV-BA
)
375 AN/ALQ-92 Countermeasures Set IMA (BRC)
380 AN/ALR-45 Countermeasure Rceiving SET IMA (EQH)
387 AN/ARC— 114 FM Communication/Navigation Set IMA
CBCZ)
39G Principles Of Management Course
89H Naval Aviation Maintenance Program Work Center
Supervisor (YMB)
89J Naval Aviation Maintenance Material Control (YMC)
89K Aviation Maintenance Management CYME)
89L Naval Aviation Maintenance Logs And Records (YiiF)
89M Naval Aviation Quality Assurance Administrative
( YMG
)
892 AERO 1—A Airborne Missile Control System IMA
(FRB)
894 F-4J weapons System Specialist OMA (FRB)
895 F-4 AWG— IB Missile Control System Familiarization
(FEC)
397 Air Launched Weapons Guided Missile IMA CWMI)
9SC J-79-GE-8/10 Three Degree IMA ( EJD
)
90 Z F-4B/J Power Plant And Related Sysrem OMA
( J-79-GE-8/i0) (FAE)
35
Code Descr i pt ion
907 F—4 Aircraft Servicing & Line Operations OMA
(Plane Captain) ( FBG
)
90S F/RF-4B/J Aircraft Mechanics OMA (FLO)
91A NC-SA Mobile Electric Power Plant IMA ( YDB
)
91 C Aviation Support Equipment NC-138 Mobile Electri-
Power Plant Systems IMA (YDK)
91D Aviation Support Equipment Hydraulic Test Stand
AHT-63/64 IMA (YEA)
9 1 K Hy dr au lie Sy t ems OMA £ HAG
)
913 F/RF-4B/J J79-GE-S/13 Power Plant IMA With Hot
Section Repair (FLP)
912 MC—2 Compass Calibrator OMA ( BMA
)
914 AN/ASW-15 AN/ASW-16 Automatic Flight Control
System IMA ( BPB
)
916 Aviation Support Equipment GTC—85 IMA (YCA)
917 Aviation Support Equipment GTCP-130 & Enclosures
IMA (YCB;
92L F—48/J/N Aircraft Egress & Environmental Control
Systems OMA (FAG)
92M F—4B/J Airframe & Hydraulic Systems OMA (FAB)
92N F-4B Electrical System OMA ( FAJ
)
92P F/RF-4B/J Air Data Computer Set IMA (FAD
86
Code Description
92T F-4 Data Link System IMA (FBZ)
92U AN/AWG—10 Transmitter & Antenna Positioning IMA
< FEK
)
92W F—4E/J Power Generating System IMA (FEP)
92X F-4 Basic Electrical Systems OMA (FEG)
92Y F-4B/J Advanced Electrical OMA ( FEH
)
93J F—4B/J RF—4B Airframes Maintenance (FLR)
93L MK—4 Gun Pod Maintenance ( WGB
)
93W F—4B/J Armament Missile And Weapon Control System
OMA ( FAP
)
932 RF-4B Electrical Systems OMA FKM
)
933 RF-4B Electrical Systems OMA < FLS
)
94M F-4J AN/AWG- 10A Missile Control System
Transitional IMA
94N AN/AWG— 12 Missile Control System Transitional IMA
943 F-4J AN/AWG-10A Missile Control System OMA
94T F-4J AN/AWG— 1(3A Missile Control System OMA (Basic)
94V AN/AWG-1QA Missile Control System IMA
94W AN/AWG— ISA Missile Control System IMA (Basic)
95-J Aviation Machinists Mate AD Entry Level
95L Aviation Machinists Mate AD (A) Entry Level
95 T Aviation Support Equipment NR—5C Mobile Air Con-
ditioner IMA YEC
95W Ground Support Equipment Charging and Starting
37
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